Criminal Copyright Infringement - Counsel Must Know of Statute of Limitations Defenses To Enter Plea Agreement

 In United States v. Boyd, 2011 WL 285196 (2d Cir. Jan. 31, 2011), the Second Circuit vacated the district court's decision that a defendant did not have ineffective assistance of counsel in negotiating a criminal copyright infringement plea agreement.   The Defendant tried to vacate his guiltly plea by claiming that his counsel was unware of the five-year statute of limitations applicable to criminal copyright infringement claims.

United States v Boyd

18 U.S.C. § 2319. Criminal infringement of a copyright

(a) Any person who violates section 506 (a) (relating to criminal offenses) of title 17 shall be punished as provided in subsections (b), (c), and (d) and such penalties shall be in addition to any other provisions of title 17 or any other law.
(b) Any person who commits an offense under section 506 (a)(1)(A) of title 17—
(1) shall be imprisoned not more than 5 years, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both, if the offense consists of the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any 180-day period, of at least 10 copies or phonorecords, of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $2,500;
(2) shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both, if the offense is a felony and is a second or subsequent offense under subsection (a); and
(3) shall be imprisoned not more than 1 year, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both, in any other case.
(c) Any person who commits an offense under section 506 (a)(1)(B) of title 17—
(1) shall be imprisoned not more than 3 years, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both, if the offense consists of the reproduction or distribution of 10 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of $2,500 or more;
(2) shall be imprisoned not more than 6 years, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both, if the offense is a felony and is a second or subsequent offense under subsection (a); and
(3) shall be imprisoned not more than 1 year, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both, if the offense consists of the reproduction or distribution of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000.
(d) Any person who commits an offense under section 506 (a)(1)(C) of title 17—
(1) shall be imprisoned not more than 3 years, fined under this title, or both;
(2) shall be imprisoned not more than 5 years, fined under this title, or both, if the offense was committed for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain;
(3) shall be imprisoned not more than 6 years, fined under this title, or both, if the offense is a felony and is a second or subsequent offense under subsection (a); and
(4) shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined under this title, or both, if the offense is a felony and is a second or subsequent offense under paragraph (2).
(e) (1) During preparation of the presentence report pursuant to Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, victims of the offense shall be permitted to submit, and the probation officer shall receive, a victim impact statement that identifies the victim of the offense and the extent and scope of the injury and loss suffered by the victim, including the estimated economic impact of the offense on that victim.
(2) Persons permitted to submit victim impact statements shall include—
(A) producers and sellers of legitimate works affected by conduct involved in the offense;
(B) holders of intellectual property rights in such works; and
(C) the legal representatives of such producers, sellers, and holders.
(f) As used in this section—
(1) the terms “phonorecord” and “copies” have, respectively, the meanings set forth in section 101 (relating to definitions) of title 17;
(2) the terms “reproduction” and “distribution” refer to the exclusive rights of a copyright owner under clauses (1) and (3) respectively of section 106 (relating to exclusive rights in copyrighted works), as limited by sections 107 through 122, of title 17;
(3) the term “financial gain” has the meaning given the term in section 101 of title 17; and
(4) the term “work being prepared for commercial distribution” has the meaning given the term in section 506 (a) of title 17.


















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Why Did Congress Write the Copyright Act's Criminal Provisions Without Using the Words "Music Piracy"?

Daniel Defoe, Author of Robinson Crusoe - Attacked By Pirates Since 1703

Image thanks to Wikipedia

I don't practice criminal law.  It is truly astonishing to see the poetic license that judges let prosecutors use to impose criminal penalties on defendants for crimes that don't exist.   Here's a case of a kid being prosecuted for "music piracy" - a crime not found in the Copyright Act, and specifically not in 17 U.S.C. Section 506 "Criminal Infringement".  U.S. v. Cassim, 2010 WL 933943, 4 (S.D.Tex. March 12, 2010).  Here is the judge's denial of defendant's motion in limine to exclude use of the term "music piracy".

IV. MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING THE TERM “MUSIC PIRACY”


Defendants seeks to exclude any use of the terms “music piracy” from the jury. They argue that this term is not evidentiary, has no probative value, and is highly inflammatory such that it will create undue prejudice. The Government, in response, argues that this term would be highly probative of the Defendants' knowledge of the unlawful object of the conspiracy. The Court finds that, because this term was and is commonly used to refer to the conduct in question, it will be difficult for witnesses and lawyers to generate an adequate substitute during questioning. It need not, therefore, be entirely excluded. However, the Court invites counsel for Defendants to suggest any possible limiting instructions which, if offered to the jury, might mitigate any possible prejudice that the term might create.

I have litigated many copyright infringement cases without the need to refer to the word "piracy" though as a civil plaintiff it is a nice synonym referring to a person who makes multiple exact duplicates, rather than someone who borrowed portions of a copyrighted work.  But it certainly is not necessary in a civil proceeding and would appear to me to be highly improper to use in a criminal proceeding.


From Wikipedia's definition of "Copyright Infringement"

Copyright infringement (or copyright violation) is the unauthorized or prohibited use of works covered by copyright law, in a way that violates one of the copyright owner's exclusive rights, such as the right to reproduce or perform the copyrighted work, or to make derivative works.


For electronic and audio-visual media, unauthorized reproduction and distribution is also commonly referred to as piracy (an early reference was made by Daniel Defoe in 1703 when he said of his novel True-born Englishman : "Its being Printed again and again, by Pyrates"). The practice of labeling the act of infringement as "piracy" actually predates copyright itself. Even prior to the 1709 enactment of the Statute of Anne, generally recognized as the first copyright law, the Stationers' Company of London in 1557 received a Royal Charter giving the company a monopoly on publication and tasking it with enforcing the charter. Those who violated the charter were labeled pirates as early as 1603.

The legal basis for this usage dates from the same era, and has been consistently applied until the present time. Critics of the use of the term "piracy" to describe such practices contend that it is pejorative and unfairly equates copyright infringement with more sinister activity, though courts often hold that under law the two terms are interchangeable.

Let's get the prosecutor a thesaurus, call the crime by the name Congress selected in drafting 17 U.S.C. Section 506 and let's leave the pirate stuff to Johnny Depp.