Top 50 Copyright Law Blogs of All Time According to Justia Blawgsearch
1. IPKat
2. Recording Industry v The People
3. Chicago IP Litigation Blog
4. Chilling Effects Clearinghouse
5. Plagiarism Today
6. The Patry Copyright Blog
7. Likelihood of Confusion
8. Internet Cases
9. Ruling Imagination: Law and Creativity
10. Copyright Litigation Blog
11. TechnoLlama
12. Nolo Presents the Law in Plain English
13. Copyfight
14. Hearsay Culture
15. IP Law Observer
16. Copyright Reform
17. Excess Copyright
18. Video Game Law Blog
19. Ex(c)lusive Rights
20. Blawg IT
21. Guiding Rights Blog
22. eLegal Canton
23. TradeMark Express: A Daily Blog
24. Lawgarithms
25. IP Blawg
26. PHOSITA
27. Control Protect & Leverage
28. LoTempio Law Blog
29. Dozier Internet Law
30. Fair Use Blog
31. Likely to Be confused - The Softer Side of IP Law
32. The Shout
33. Trademark, Copyright and Entertainment Law Forum
34. Contemporary Intellectual Property
35. Tsibouris & Associates Law Blog
36. Technowledgy Blog
37. A Copyfighter's Musings
38. Privacy and IP Law Blog
39. Current copyright readings
40. Fairly used
41. IP Litigation Law Blog
42. tech law advisor
43. IPwar's
44. Academic Copyright
45. Rules for the Revolution
46. chosaq
47. free the books
48. CopyOwner
49. Google Copyright Blog
50. Moral Panics and the Copyright Wars
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook 2010 by Raymond J. Dowd from West here
Celebrity Pictures, Celebrity Videos, Celebrity News, Celebrity Gossip & Entertainment News Leaders
Showing posts with label ip. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ip. Show all posts
Sunday, March 6, 2011
Monday, February 28, 2011
Top 50 Intellectual Property Law Blogs of All Time - Source Justia Blawgsearch
According to Justia's Blawgsearch, these are the top 50 Intellectual Property Law Blogs of all time
1. IP Thinktank
2. IPKat
3. Patent Docs
4. Patently-O
5. IPBiz
6. The Trademark Blog
7. Recording Industry v. The People
8. Technology & Marketing Law Blog
9. 43(B)log
10. Philip Brooks Patent Infringement Blog
11. University of Chicago Law School Faculty Blog
12. Chicago IP Litigation Blog
13. Two Seventy-One Patent Blog
14. Eastern District of Texas Federal Court Practice Blog
15. The TTABlog
16. Illinois Business Law Society
17. Seattle Trademark Lawyer
18. Orange Book Blog
19. Plagiarism Today
20. Patent Baristas
21. Erik J. Heels
22. I/P Updates
23. Los Angeles Intellectual Property Blog
24. Patent Arcade
25. University of Chicago Law School Faculty Podcast
26. The Patry Copyright Blog
27. Copywrite
28. Anticipatethis.com
29. US Law Watch
30. Furd Log
31. The Prior Art
32. Library Law Blog
33. IP Watchdog
34. Likelihood of Confusion
35. Trade Secrets Blog
36. Tiny Tech IP
37. Maryland Intellectual Property Law Blog
38. Daily Dose of IP
39. Internet Cases
40. ITC 337 Law Blog
41. Counterfeit Chic
42. IP Dragon
43. Law & Disorder
44. The Invent Blog
45. Patent Prospector
46. Filewrapper.com
47. Duets Blog
48. Ruling Imagination: Law and Creativity
49. TechnoLlama
50. Copyright Litigation Blog
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook 2010 by Raymond J. Dowd from West here
1. IP Thinktank
2. IPKat
3. Patent Docs
4. Patently-O
5. IPBiz
6. The Trademark Blog
7. Recording Industry v. The People
8. Technology & Marketing Law Blog
9. 43(B)log
10. Philip Brooks Patent Infringement Blog
11. University of Chicago Law School Faculty Blog
12. Chicago IP Litigation Blog
13. Two Seventy-One Patent Blog
14. Eastern District of Texas Federal Court Practice Blog
15. The TTABlog
16. Illinois Business Law Society
17. Seattle Trademark Lawyer
18. Orange Book Blog
19. Plagiarism Today
20. Patent Baristas
21. Erik J. Heels
22. I/P Updates
23. Los Angeles Intellectual Property Blog
24. Patent Arcade
25. University of Chicago Law School Faculty Podcast
26. The Patry Copyright Blog
27. Copywrite
28. Anticipatethis.com
29. US Law Watch
30. Furd Log
31. The Prior Art
32. Library Law Blog
33. IP Watchdog
34. Likelihood of Confusion
35. Trade Secrets Blog
36. Tiny Tech IP
37. Maryland Intellectual Property Law Blog
38. Daily Dose of IP
39. Internet Cases
40. ITC 337 Law Blog
41. Counterfeit Chic
42. IP Dragon
43. Law & Disorder
44. The Invent Blog
45. Patent Prospector
46. Filewrapper.com
47. Duets Blog
48. Ruling Imagination: Law and Creativity
49. TechnoLlama
50. Copyright Litigation Blog
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook 2010 by Raymond J. Dowd from West here
Saturday, February 12, 2011
Jimi Hendrix - Dead Celebrity Rights of Publicity Not Resurrected By Washington State Law
In Experience Hendrix, LLC v. Hendrixlicensing.com, (W.D.Wa. Feb. 8, 2011 (Zilly, J.), a federal judge in the Western District of Washington struck down as unconstitutional a Washington State law that attempted to grant dead celebrities, including Jimi Hendrix, a posthumous right of publicity.
I have previously discussed rights of publicity (also known as rights of privacy) here and here and here.
Jimi Hendrix died in New York. New York does not grant a posthumous right of publicity. That has created major litigation in the past over, for example, Marilyn Monroe's image and name. Hendrix was not a Washington State domiciliary, so granting his estate a right of publicity would effectively have created a right that conflicted with New York law.
The court engaged in a careful choice of law (conflicts of law) analyis. It used the principle of "depecage" (I don't have a circonflexe on this blog). "Depecage" means parsing out the law of each juridisction that may govern an issue in a case. Courts rarely go this deeply and thoughtfully into choice of law analyses, so the opinion is noteworthy in that aspect.
The decision is also noteworthy in that it carefully unbundles the various rights that may be caught up in licensing someone else's name and image including trademark and copyright.
For example, if you have a photograph of Jimi Hendrix, it may be "nominative fair use" to use Hendrix's name to identify the photograph, even if someone else owns the Hendrix trademark.
The estate of Elvis, who died in Tennessee, has the right to exploit his name and image under Tennessee law.
Be careful before paying a lot of money for a license to ensure that the rights really exist. Similarly, when accused of infringement, take a careful look at the underlying intellectual property claims.
Jim Hendrix and Rights of Publicity for Dead Celebrities: Experience Hendrix v Hendrixlicensing.com
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook 2010 by Raymond J. Dowd from West here
Friday, February 11, 2011
Fair Use Fridays: Plagiarism and Quotation PSA
A good constructive explanation of how to quote and cite in an academic context.
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook 2010 by Raymond J. Dowd from West here
Wednesday, February 9, 2011
The State and Future of #Twitter and #NewTwitter Video
Nice three-part article on Twitter from Brian Solis here.
The New Twitter rollout:
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook 2010 by Raymond J. Dowd from West here
Tuesday, February 8, 2011
2010 U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR ANNUAL REPORT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT
President Obama's IP Czar Victoria Espinel issued her first report on intellectual property enforcement today, find it here
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook 2010 by Raymond J. Dowd from West here
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook 2010 by Raymond J. Dowd from West here
Monday, February 7, 2011
Friday, July 2, 2010
Fair Use Fridays: Hula Photo Infringement?
Is making a stained glass window substantially similar to a copyrighted photograph fair use? Does it matter that the pose and costume is part of an ancient hula tradition? Copyright meets cultural heritage. Compare, decide and read what the court said. Last December I attended the first annual Federal Bar Association Hawaii Chapter Conference and got a chance to discuss the case with the judge who decided it. I hope to go to Hawaii again this December, it is probably the best place in the world to get CLE credit and talk to federal judges bedecked in leis...
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook from West here
Reece v. Island Treasures Art Gallery, Inc., 2006 WL 3804685 (D. Haw. 2006).
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook from West here
Thursday, July 1, 2010
Copyright Litigation Blog #1 on Bing
In addition to being the #1 result for a "copyright litigation" search on Google, the Copyright Litigation Blog is also the number one result on Bing.
Thanks, Bing!
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook from West here
Cease and Desist Letters: The Attack on Unicorn Meat
Would this image/entry at Thinkgeek confuse you?
Prof. Rebecca Tushnet reports here on a doozy of a cease and desist letter: the Thinkgeek blog posted a non-existent April Fool's Day Unicorn Meat product and the National Pork Board responded with a cease and desist letter, details here.
Overreaching by TM and copyright owners really hurts owners who legitimately protect their brands and creative works. Note to lawyers: leave the fools alone on April 1.
Practice Tip: Chapter 6 of Copyright Litigation Handbook is titled "Cease and Desist Letters and Declaratory Judgment Actions". I cover the many pitfalls involved in sending cease and desist letters and the ample case law showing that many lawyers, a surprising number in big law firms, tend not to think carefully about the potential consequences before sending these letters. The "first to file" rule has some tricky exceptions. A cease and desist letter may be met with a declaratory judgment action in an inconvenient jurisdiction. 28 USC 2201. Try explaining that little surprise to your client.
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook from West here
Tuesday, June 29, 2010
8th Cir: Famous Dave's Magic Words: Copyright Assignments and Settlement Agreements
In Thomsen v. Famous Dave's of America, 2010 WL 2219051 (8th Cir. May 12, 2010), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found the following provision in a settlement agreement to be a valid copyright assignment:
"Al is releasing all copyright, proprietary design and sign work to [Famous Dave's] in all other restaurants that he has worked on with the exception of [signature restaurants]."
Quoting the Ninth Circuit, the Court noted: "A transfer of ownership requires no "magic words" to satisfy copyright law: even a one-line pro forma statement will do."
The Court found the assignment to be a "clear conveyance".
Practice Tip: An assignee is considered a "beneficial owner" of a copyright under the Copyright Act 17 U.S.C. 501(b) and is entitled to sue for infringement. I cover Copyright Ownership and Licensing Litigation in more detail in Chapter 8 of Copyright Litigation Handbook.
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook from West here
Sunday, June 27, 2010
Fair Use Fridays: Statue of Liberty in Public Domain
Fair use Friday photo of yours truly by NY real estate guru Paolo Zampolli. Good example of photographing a public domain sculpture (the copyright expired) and a U.S. government work - the U.S. flag (not subject to copyright). Despite Paolo's best efforts and the tour of New York Harbor on his luxury speedboat, I did not purchase the Statue of Liberty, despite the excellent price Paolo offered. :-)
Italicized text and images below from http://www.loc.gov/wiseguide/oct04/statue.html
Designed and executed by French sculptor Frederic Auguste Bartholdi, the Statue of Liberty was presented by the people of France to the people of America to honor the friendship between the two nations. The statue's significance has broadened over the years, and it is now recognized throughout the world as a symbol of liberty and freedom. Erected on Bedloe's Island in New York Harbor and dedicated on Oct. 28, 1886, the statue has stirred the emotions of millions.
On Aug. 31, 1876, the Copyright Office issued copyright registration number 9939-G for the "Statue of American Independence" as the Statue of Liberty was first named. The copyright claim was filed in America's centennial year, a decade before the statue was erected in New York Harbor. Deposited with the application in the Copyright Office were two rare images. The first is a photograph of the artist's final study model, believed to be executed in terra cotta. The second image is an artistic rendering of how the statue would appear against the New York skyline after it was finally erected on the pedestal designed by architect Richard M. Hunt. This second image has great significance because it shows a very early version of the statue that most people would not recognize. In the original design, the Statue of Liberty is shown holding in her left hand a broken chain and shackle, which represent freedom newly achieved. Bartholdi later made a major change to his design by placing the chain and shackle, symbolically broken by Liberty, at her feet. He then positioned the familiar tablet, inscribed "July IV, MDCCLXXVI" (July 4, 1776), in her left hand.
In 1984, curators working on the Copyright Office exhibition "By Securing to Authors: Copyright, Commerce and Creativity in America" came across this copyright with rare attached documentation. The historic images described above are on permanent display in the exhibit on the fourth floor of the Madison Building (Monday - Friday, 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.), along with documentation for the copyright on the pedestal.
Many images and renderings of the Statue of Liberty, including some that reveal interesting details of this symbol of American freedom, are in the Prints and Photographs Online Catalog. Just type "Statue of Liberty" in the search box. The Historic American Buildings Survey has also documented this work extensively. These images are in the American Memory collection "Built in America." Type "Statue of Liberty Liberty Island" in the search box. The 230 black-and-white photos are older images; the 51 color transparencies offer extraordinary views of the statue during its most recent restoration.
Since the copyright registration and deposit system was centralized in the Library of Congress in 1870, more than 30 million creative works have been registered for copyright protection.
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook from West here
Thursday, June 24, 2010
Obama Administration's 2010 IP Enforcement Strategic Plan
New report from the Obama Administration's IP Czar
2010 Joint Strategic Plan on IP Enforcement
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook from West here
2010 Joint Strategic Plan on IP Enforcement
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook from West here
Wednesday, June 23, 2010
DC Cir: RIAAA Must Pay Copyright Owners Late Fees - Ruling on Compulsory Licensing of Musical Works
In Recording Indus. Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Librarian of Congress, --- F.3d --- (D.C. Cir. June 22, 2010), the D.C. Circuit upheld the Copyright Royalty Board's imposition of late fees on the RIAA when it fails to pay copyright owners.
The issue arises in the case of "compulsory licenses" - that is where someone uses a musical work without the owner's permission. Like a cover band recording a Led Zep tune without the band's permission. The DC Circuit's decision has a nice explanation of compulsory licensing and how it works. Excerpt below in italics:
Most songs played on the radio, sold on CDs in music stores, or digitally available on the Internet through services like iTunes embody two distinct copyrights-a copyright in the “musical work” and a copyright in the “sound recording.” See 17 U.S.C. § 102. The musical work is the musical composition-the notes and lyrics of the song as they appear on sheet music. The sound recording is the recorded musical work performed by a specific artist.
Although almost always intermingled in a single song, those two copyrights are legally distinct and may be owned and licensed separately. One party might own the copyright in the words and musical arrangement of a song, and another party might own the copyright in a particular artist's recording of those words and musical notes.
This case involves licenses in a limited category of copyrighted musical works-as opposed to sound recordings. Section 115 of the Copyright Act allows an individual to make and distribute phonorecords (that is, sound recordings) of a copyrighted musical work without reaching any kind of agreement with the copyright owner. That right does not include authorization to make exact copies of an existing sound recording and distribute it; if a musical work has been recorded and copyrighted by another artist, a licensee “may exercise his rights under the [§ 115] license only by assembling his own musicians, singers, recording engineers and equipment, etc. for the purpose of recording anew the musical work that is the subject of the [§ 115] license.” 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 8.04[A], at 8-58.5 (2009). For example, a § 115 licensee could pull together a group of musicians to record and sell a cover version of Bruce Springsteen's 1975 hit Born to Run, but that licensee could not make copies of Springsteen's recording of that song and sell them.
The § 115 licensing regime operates in a fairly straightforward manner. When a copyright owner distributes work “to the public,” § 115's provisions are triggered. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1). Once that occurs, anyone may “obtain a compulsory license to make and distribute phonorecords of the work” under § 115 so long as the “primary purpose in making [the] phonorecords is to distribute them to the public for private use.” Id. Assuming the copyright has been registered with the Copyright Office, the licensee owes the copyright owner a royalty for every phonorecord “made and distributed in accordance with the [§ 115] license.” Id. § 115(c)(2). For purposes of the Copyright Act, a phonorecord is “distributed”-and an obligation to pay the copyright owner a royalty created-when “the person exercising the [§ 115] license has voluntarily and permanently parted with” the phonorecord. Id . In other words, the licensee's sale of its recording of the copyright owner's work triggers the royalty payment obligation. See Nimmer § 8.04[H][1], at 8-77.
Because the § 115 license issues without any agreement between the copyright owner and the licensee, the system needs a mechanism to figure out how much the licensee owes the copyright owner and what the terms for paying that rate should be. Although that mechanism has changed over time, the Copyright Royalty Board currently serves as the rulemaking body for this system. See generally Procedural Regulations for the Copyright Royalty Board, 70 Fed.Reg. 30,901 (May 31, 2005) (discussing the history of royalty ratemaking). The Board is a three-person panel appointed by the Librarian of Congress and removable only for cause by the Librarian.FN1 The Board sets the terms and rates for copyright royalties when copyright owners and licensees fail to negotiate terms and rates themselves. See Nimmer § 7.27[C], at 7-243.
FN1. RIAA has not raised a constitutional challenge to the method of appointment of the members of the Copyright Royalty Board. Cf. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 574 F.3d 748, 755-56 (D.C.Cir.2009); SoundExchange, Inc. v. Librarian of Congress, 571 F.3d 1220, 1226-27 (D.C.Cir.2009) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
As relevant here, the Copyright Act requires the Board to set “reasonable terms and rates” for royalty payments made under the § 115 license when the parties to the license fail to do so. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1). When establishing terms and rates under that license, the Copyright Act requires the Board to balance four general and sometimes conflicting policy objectives: (1) maximizing the availability of creative works to the public; (2) providing copyright owners a fair return for their creative works and copyright users a fair income; (3) recognizing the relative roles of the copyright owners and users; and (4) minimizing any disruptive impact on the industries involved. Id. § 801(b)(1)(A)-(D).
At specified intervals, the Board holds ratemaking proceedings for licenses issued under the Copyright Act. Section 115 ratemaking proceedings can occur every five years “or at such other times as the parties have agreed.” Id. § 804(b)(4).
In 1996, the parties with an interest in the § 115 license (such as the Recording Industry Association of America, the Songwriter's Guild of America, and the National Music Publishers' Association) agreed on various terms and rates for the compulsory license. They also agreed that the settlement with respect to those terms and rates would expire 10 years later. In 2006, after the parties found they could not reach a new compromise, the Board instituted proceedings to set certain terms and rates governing the operation of the § 115 license. The process was long and complicated, involving 28 days of live testimony, more than 140 exhibits, and more than 340 pleadings, motions, and orders. See Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Determination Proceeding, 74 Fed.Reg. 4510, 4511 (Jan. 26, 2009).
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook from West here
The issue arises in the case of "compulsory licenses" - that is where someone uses a musical work without the owner's permission. Like a cover band recording a Led Zep tune without the band's permission. The DC Circuit's decision has a nice explanation of compulsory licensing and how it works. Excerpt below in italics:
Most songs played on the radio, sold on CDs in music stores, or digitally available on the Internet through services like iTunes embody two distinct copyrights-a copyright in the “musical work” and a copyright in the “sound recording.” See 17 U.S.C. § 102. The musical work is the musical composition-the notes and lyrics of the song as they appear on sheet music. The sound recording is the recorded musical work performed by a specific artist.
Although almost always intermingled in a single song, those two copyrights are legally distinct and may be owned and licensed separately. One party might own the copyright in the words and musical arrangement of a song, and another party might own the copyright in a particular artist's recording of those words and musical notes.
This case involves licenses in a limited category of copyrighted musical works-as opposed to sound recordings. Section 115 of the Copyright Act allows an individual to make and distribute phonorecords (that is, sound recordings) of a copyrighted musical work without reaching any kind of agreement with the copyright owner. That right does not include authorization to make exact copies of an existing sound recording and distribute it; if a musical work has been recorded and copyrighted by another artist, a licensee “may exercise his rights under the [§ 115] license only by assembling his own musicians, singers, recording engineers and equipment, etc. for the purpose of recording anew the musical work that is the subject of the [§ 115] license.” 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 8.04[A], at 8-58.5 (2009). For example, a § 115 licensee could pull together a group of musicians to record and sell a cover version of Bruce Springsteen's 1975 hit Born to Run, but that licensee could not make copies of Springsteen's recording of that song and sell them.
The § 115 licensing regime operates in a fairly straightforward manner. When a copyright owner distributes work “to the public,” § 115's provisions are triggered. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1). Once that occurs, anyone may “obtain a compulsory license to make and distribute phonorecords of the work” under § 115 so long as the “primary purpose in making [the] phonorecords is to distribute them to the public for private use.” Id. Assuming the copyright has been registered with the Copyright Office, the licensee owes the copyright owner a royalty for every phonorecord “made and distributed in accordance with the [§ 115] license.” Id. § 115(c)(2). For purposes of the Copyright Act, a phonorecord is “distributed”-and an obligation to pay the copyright owner a royalty created-when “the person exercising the [§ 115] license has voluntarily and permanently parted with” the phonorecord. Id . In other words, the licensee's sale of its recording of the copyright owner's work triggers the royalty payment obligation. See Nimmer § 8.04[H][1], at 8-77.
Because the § 115 license issues without any agreement between the copyright owner and the licensee, the system needs a mechanism to figure out how much the licensee owes the copyright owner and what the terms for paying that rate should be. Although that mechanism has changed over time, the Copyright Royalty Board currently serves as the rulemaking body for this system. See generally Procedural Regulations for the Copyright Royalty Board, 70 Fed.Reg. 30,901 (May 31, 2005) (discussing the history of royalty ratemaking). The Board is a three-person panel appointed by the Librarian of Congress and removable only for cause by the Librarian.FN1 The Board sets the terms and rates for copyright royalties when copyright owners and licensees fail to negotiate terms and rates themselves. See Nimmer § 7.27[C], at 7-243.
FN1. RIAA has not raised a constitutional challenge to the method of appointment of the members of the Copyright Royalty Board. Cf. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 574 F.3d 748, 755-56 (D.C.Cir.2009); SoundExchange, Inc. v. Librarian of Congress, 571 F.3d 1220, 1226-27 (D.C.Cir.2009) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
As relevant here, the Copyright Act requires the Board to set “reasonable terms and rates” for royalty payments made under the § 115 license when the parties to the license fail to do so. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1). When establishing terms and rates under that license, the Copyright Act requires the Board to balance four general and sometimes conflicting policy objectives: (1) maximizing the availability of creative works to the public; (2) providing copyright owners a fair return for their creative works and copyright users a fair income; (3) recognizing the relative roles of the copyright owners and users; and (4) minimizing any disruptive impact on the industries involved. Id. § 801(b)(1)(A)-(D).
At specified intervals, the Board holds ratemaking proceedings for licenses issued under the Copyright Act. Section 115 ratemaking proceedings can occur every five years “or at such other times as the parties have agreed.” Id. § 804(b)(4).
In 1996, the parties with an interest in the § 115 license (such as the Recording Industry Association of America, the Songwriter's Guild of America, and the National Music Publishers' Association) agreed on various terms and rates for the compulsory license. They also agreed that the settlement with respect to those terms and rates would expire 10 years later. In 2006, after the parties found they could not reach a new compromise, the Board instituted proceedings to set certain terms and rates governing the operation of the § 115 license. The process was long and complicated, involving 28 days of live testimony, more than 140 exhibits, and more than 340 pleadings, motions, and orders. See Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Determination Proceeding, 74 Fed.Reg. 4510, 4511 (Jan. 26, 2009).
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook from West here
Tuesday, June 22, 2010
10th Cir: Golan v Holder - First Amendment Challenge to Berne Convention's Taking Works Out of Public Domain Retroactively Fails
The 10th Circuit ruled yesterday against a group of distributors of foreign copyrighted works that had fallen into the public domain, but which Congress had restored copyright status by 1994 legislation implementing the Berne Convention, following the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.
The group, represented in part by Prof. Lawrence Lessig and the Center for Internet and Society, included a man who had composed a marching band song based on a Shostakovitch symphony that had fallen into the public domain.
The situation arose because the US used to have a rule that if you didn't put a copyright notice on your work and register it with the US copyright office, it would fall into the public domain. Many distributors of foreign copyrighted works failed to put proper notices on them or register them with the copyright office. Notices and registration are known as "formalities". For a while, the US was a rare country that required formalities, most didn't, pursuant to the Berne Convention. The US enacted the Berne Convention Implementation Act in 1988 abolishing the requirement of formalities, but it did not restore copyright protection to foreign works that had fallen out of copyright. In 1994, Congress restored copyright protection to these foreign works (it was not automatic and involved some bureaucracy). People who'd used the works or created derivative works were supposed to work out reasonable license fees or have them fixed by the courts.
You can find the requirement of formalities in the Copyright Act of 1909. I have included the entire 1909 Copyright Act for easy reference as an appendix to my Copyright Litigation Handbook.
The decision has a lot of interesting legislative history, and it's got a lot of litigation history. (From my memory) it was in district court where plaintiff lost, there was an appeal that plaintiff won with instruction to perform a First Amendment analysis on remand, then plaintiff won again with the district judge holding that the statute violated the First Amendment. Now, the 10th Circuit reverses, link to decision below:
10th Cir: Golan v Holder - First Amendment Challenge To Removal of Copyrighted Works From Public Domain Fails
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook from West here
The group, represented in part by Prof. Lawrence Lessig and the Center for Internet and Society, included a man who had composed a marching band song based on a Shostakovitch symphony that had fallen into the public domain.
The situation arose because the US used to have a rule that if you didn't put a copyright notice on your work and register it with the US copyright office, it would fall into the public domain. Many distributors of foreign copyrighted works failed to put proper notices on them or register them with the copyright office. Notices and registration are known as "formalities". For a while, the US was a rare country that required formalities, most didn't, pursuant to the Berne Convention. The US enacted the Berne Convention Implementation Act in 1988 abolishing the requirement of formalities, but it did not restore copyright protection to foreign works that had fallen out of copyright. In 1994, Congress restored copyright protection to these foreign works (it was not automatic and involved some bureaucracy). People who'd used the works or created derivative works were supposed to work out reasonable license fees or have them fixed by the courts.
You can find the requirement of formalities in the Copyright Act of 1909. I have included the entire 1909 Copyright Act for easy reference as an appendix to my Copyright Litigation Handbook.
The decision has a lot of interesting legislative history, and it's got a lot of litigation history. (From my memory) it was in district court where plaintiff lost, there was an appeal that plaintiff won with instruction to perform a First Amendment analysis on remand, then plaintiff won again with the district judge holding that the statute violated the First Amendment. Now, the 10th Circuit reverses, link to decision below:
10th Cir: Golan v Holder - First Amendment Challenge To Removal of Copyrighted Works From Public Domain Fails
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook from West here
Monday, June 21, 2010
ACTA Update: Endorse A Petition Opposing ACTA
If you would like to voice your concern about the pending Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, a petition is going out soon, to view it and sign up, the link is below:
PIJIP: - American University Washington College of Law
My comments on ACTA here and here.
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook from West here
PIJIP: - American University Washington College of Law
My comments on ACTA here and here.
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook from West here
Friday, June 18, 2010
Fair Use Fridays: Ripping DVDs For Documentary Films - Is There A Right To High Quality Free Speech?
We know from the recent Salinger/Colting case discussed here that prior restraints on speech must be weighed when we look at injunctions in the copyright infringement context.
But what about in the fair use context? Let's look at the statute and think about a documentary filmmaker who wants to make a "fair use" of someone else's copyrighted work:
Section 107 of the Copright Act - 17 U.S.C. § 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
The Digital Millenium Copyright Act makes it a crime to circumvent encryption to rip someone else's copyrighted materials. So isn't that criminal statute an impermissible prior restraint on free speech?
Doc filmmakers can't make good quality films without ripping DVDs. They can get lower quality elsewhere.
The Copyright Office should act soon because the International Documentary Association has asked that the exemptions to the DMCA be reviewed. HT to Techdirt, Hillicon Valley, reports here. Mike Masnick at Techdirt is pessimistic, read the link:
Documentary Filmmakers Want DMCA Exemption; But Almost Definitely Won't Get It Techdirt
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook from West here
But what about in the fair use context? Let's look at the statute and think about a documentary filmmaker who wants to make a "fair use" of someone else's copyrighted work:
Section 107 of the Copright Act - 17 U.S.C. § 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
The Digital Millenium Copyright Act makes it a crime to circumvent encryption to rip someone else's copyrighted materials. So isn't that criminal statute an impermissible prior restraint on free speech?
Doc filmmakers can't make good quality films without ripping DVDs. They can get lower quality elsewhere.
The Copyright Office should act soon because the International Documentary Association has asked that the exemptions to the DMCA be reviewed. HT to Techdirt, Hillicon Valley, reports here. Mike Masnick at Techdirt is pessimistic, read the link:
Documentary Filmmakers Want DMCA Exemption; But Almost Definitely Won't Get It Techdirt
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook from West here
Thursday, June 17, 2010
2d Cir: The Long Arm of New York Copyright Holders: Can New York Copyright Lawyers Sue America Without Leaving Manhattan?
From http://www.american-buddha.com/
Manhattan is a great place to be a copyright lawyer. Since it is the publishing and advertising capital of the world, there is usually someone here in the infringement food chain. With a subway ride, we are in court. But how far will New York law, its long-arm statute, permit New York lawyers to pursue infringers who are not located in New York?
In Penguin Group v. American Buddha, 09-1739-cv (June 15, 2010), Judge Sack wrote an opinion for the Second Circuit certifying the following question to the New York Court of Appeals:
In copyright infringement cases, is the situs of injury for purposes of determining long-arm jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(ii) the location of the infringing action or the residence or location of the principal place of business of the copyright holder?
The question is a major one. American Buddha put copyrighted Penguin works online, claiming fair use. People downloaded them outside of New York State. Is the economic injury felt by the New York copyright holder enough to support long arm personal jurisdiction in New York State?
This is a debate of extraordinary importance for New York. The District Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Where state law is unclear, a federal appeals court may certify the question to the New York Court of Appeals seeking an answer to the question. If the NY Court of Appeals says that New York's long arm statute provides no jurisdiction, the District Court's opinion will be affirmed. If the NY Court of Appeals finds jurisdiction, the Second Circuit has indicated that it will remand back to the District Court for further proceedings.
In the coming year, expect a debate to rage in the copyright community, these are big questions that could reshape our entire legal system and our notions of due process in a digital world.
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook from West here
Tuesday, June 8, 2010
9th Cir: Bypasses Rule 11 Safe Harbors Whacks Attorney for $258,000
On April 26, 2010 I posted here on the Seventh Circuit hitting an attorney with a $60,000 sanction for litigating a copyright action. The sanction was based on 28 U.S.C. section 1927 and the court's inherent power. Notable in that case was that the sophisticated adversary had not made a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, nor had the court issued a show cause order pursuant to Rule 11.
Now comes Lahiri v. Universal Music and Video, --- F.3d ----, 2010 WL 2246401 (9th Cir. June 7, 2010). This time, using 29 U.S.C. section 1927 - and again no Rule 11 motion discernable from the opinion, and the plaintiff's attorney is whacked for $258,206.04.
The facts involve the attorney, supposedly a sophisticated copyright practitioner, who took what the court determined to be a bad faith position based on Indian law of copyright, which governed ownership to the soundtrack of a film. The court determined that he misrepresented Indian law, that Indian law is written in English, and that there was no need for the attorney to rely on an Indian law expert since Indian law is written in English.
This, like the Seventh Circuit's decision, is terrible precedent. The Circuit courts are criminalizing the practice of law and depriving attorneys of property without due process of law. If it took $258,000 in legal fees to prove that the guy was wrong, his error -- or even what the court found to be a misrepresentation -- could not have been so obvious.
If your adversary lies, you bring it to the judge's attention through a Rule 11 motion, which has a 20 day safe harbor. If the judge thinks the lawyer lied, the judge, following Rule 11 is supposed to order the attorney to show cause under Rule 11 why he ought not be sanctioned.
Now, using 28 U.S.C. section 1927, federal judges are passing the blame for cases that they let languish (here for five years) onto the losing lawyer, criminalizing his actions ex post facto.
§ 1927. Counsel’s liability for excessive costs
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
In the harsh light of the rear view mirror, attorneys on either side of a case get things wrong, make blunders, or misrepresent facts (sometimes good faith mistakes, sometimes bad faith). That is the nature of litigation practice. As we all know, practically every attorney in Los Angeles thinks of him/herself as an experienced copyright practitioner.
When federal judges have decided to take out a pen and criminalize the losing attorney for making losing or unreasonable arguments, it is a very dangerous time for our system of justice. 28 USC 1927 talks about vexatiously multiplying the proceedings. In this case, the guy made one Lanham Act claim and one copyright claim. The defendant made two summary judgment motions and won, then claimed over $800,000 from the loser.
If the guy was so wrong, why didn't UMG's counsel Loeb & Loeb make a Rule 11 motion? If they thought his arguments were frivolous, why did they sit on their hands rather than following Rule 11? And how did they run up an 800K bill for two summary judgment motions?
In the Copyright Litigation Handbook, I devote much discussion to attorney sanctions: what gets you into trouble, and how to avoid it. Unfortunately, the situation is getting more dangerous, and no one feels sorry for lawyers. Put aside your schadenfreude and think hard about what this means for you, your firm, and the quality of justice in America.
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook from West here
Now comes Lahiri v. Universal Music and Video, --- F.3d ----, 2010 WL 2246401 (9th Cir. June 7, 2010). This time, using 29 U.S.C. section 1927 - and again no Rule 11 motion discernable from the opinion, and the plaintiff's attorney is whacked for $258,206.04.
The facts involve the attorney, supposedly a sophisticated copyright practitioner, who took what the court determined to be a bad faith position based on Indian law of copyright, which governed ownership to the soundtrack of a film. The court determined that he misrepresented Indian law, that Indian law is written in English, and that there was no need for the attorney to rely on an Indian law expert since Indian law is written in English.
This, like the Seventh Circuit's decision, is terrible precedent. The Circuit courts are criminalizing the practice of law and depriving attorneys of property without due process of law. If it took $258,000 in legal fees to prove that the guy was wrong, his error -- or even what the court found to be a misrepresentation -- could not have been so obvious.
If your adversary lies, you bring it to the judge's attention through a Rule 11 motion, which has a 20 day safe harbor. If the judge thinks the lawyer lied, the judge, following Rule 11 is supposed to order the attorney to show cause under Rule 11 why he ought not be sanctioned.
Now, using 28 U.S.C. section 1927, federal judges are passing the blame for cases that they let languish (here for five years) onto the losing lawyer, criminalizing his actions ex post facto.
§ 1927. Counsel’s liability for excessive costs
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
In the harsh light of the rear view mirror, attorneys on either side of a case get things wrong, make blunders, or misrepresent facts (sometimes good faith mistakes, sometimes bad faith). That is the nature of litigation practice. As we all know, practically every attorney in Los Angeles thinks of him/herself as an experienced copyright practitioner.
When federal judges have decided to take out a pen and criminalize the losing attorney for making losing or unreasonable arguments, it is a very dangerous time for our system of justice. 28 USC 1927 talks about vexatiously multiplying the proceedings. In this case, the guy made one Lanham Act claim and one copyright claim. The defendant made two summary judgment motions and won, then claimed over $800,000 from the loser.
If the guy was so wrong, why didn't UMG's counsel Loeb & Loeb make a Rule 11 motion? If they thought his arguments were frivolous, why did they sit on their hands rather than following Rule 11? And how did they run up an 800K bill for two summary judgment motions?
In the Copyright Litigation Handbook, I devote much discussion to attorney sanctions: what gets you into trouble, and how to avoid it. Unfortunately, the situation is getting more dangerous, and no one feels sorry for lawyers. Put aside your schadenfreude and think hard about what this means for you, your firm, and the quality of justice in America.
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook from West here
Saturday, June 5, 2010
ACTA Update: Obama Administration's IP Strategy Comes Under Fire From Tech Associations
For background on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, visit the excellent Wikipedia page.
Last week my post on ACTA was picked up in a very kind and thoughtful review by Mike Masnik, of Techdirt, here. Thanks, Mike! I didn't know anyone read my blog.
My take on ACTA, agreeing with EFF that Anti-Counterfeiting Treaty is a Sham" here.
A great analysis (in a more subdued and more thoughtful - and thus credible - Washingtontonian way), from the Center for Democracy you will find here. Looking past the measured language, they are accusing copyright lobbyists of wishing to get through ACTA what they might not get in the US, take over Third World governments and use ACTA as a means of cramming copyright content into those countries' media systems while completely depriving the citizens of those countries of rights equivalent to the First Amendment.
And below a link to recent developments on Capitol Hill - consumer electronics trade associations waking up to ACTA's implications: Consumer Electronics Association, TechAmerica and the Computer & Communications Industry Association
Three tech associations oppose Obama IP effort on anti-counterfeiting deal - The Hill's Hillicon Valley
Ben Scheffner's March 3, 2010 post of a letter from USTR Ron Kirk to Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Or) claiming that ACTA would not alter existing US law here.
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook from West here
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