If you submit a script to a Hollywood producer who doesn't buy it, but uses the concept, do you have a claim?
On May 4, 2010, a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals killed Hollywood by holding that implied contracts for the sale of ideas that were previously protected under California state law (pitch meetings for films) were preempted by the Copyright Act. My post here.
The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc (before every judge on the court). My post linking to the video of the hearing en banc here.
Yesterday, in Montz v. Pilgrim (9th Cir. May 4, 2011) one year after the original Ninth Circuit three-year panel killed the Hollywood pitch claim, the full Ninth Circuit reversed the panel and held that implied contracts for the sale of ideas under California state law are not preempted by the Copyright Act. Decision below, with two dissents, required reading.
If you care about this area of law, watch the video of oral argument before the Ninth Circuit, it is excellent.
If you want to learn about how Hollywood really works, read one of the great American novels: What Makes Sammy Run? by Budd Schulberg. They say that the novel is so true to life that Hollywood will never make the film. It of course involves theft of ideas, exploitation of writers, unbridled ambition and chicanery.
Montz v Pilgrim Films
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Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook 2010 by Raymond J. Dowd from West here
Showing posts with label implied contract. Show all posts
Showing posts with label implied contract. Show all posts
Thursday, May 5, 2011
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
9th Circuit en Banc: Preemption of Contracts Involving Ideas, and Judges on YouTube: Gnarly!
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has a channel on YouTube. A couple of weeks back, I met Chief Judge Alex Kozinski at a Federal Bar Association cocktail party with the greeting "Hey Judge I saw you on YouTube!" This is the type of greeting that New Yorkers think Californians will enjoy. I survived the greeting to have a good discussion. The Cassirer case, the Ninth Circuit en banc video on YouTube here.
But once again, I am drawn back to YouTube for a wonderful argument on an important case (thank you Anonymous tipster). My initial post on the 9th Circuit's original decision in Montz v. Pilgrim Films here.
I rarely take a position in copyright cases (as opposed to Nazi art looting cases) saying that a case is right or wrong. Sometimes I say that a copyright case is well-reasoned. But Montz v. Pilgrim Films, as you can see from my earlier post here, is a case where I opined that the 9th Circuit was "clearly incorrect".
Now with the argument on YouTube, you too can access the wonderful world of copyright and the cutting-edge issue of preemption. Here, the issue is whether or not a state can regulate contracts governing the buying and selling of ideas. This is big, heady, important stuff and this case is of extraordinary importance. I am happy to see the Ninth Circuit take it en banc.
In Chapter 10 of Copyright Litigation Handbook "Removal from State Court and Preemption" I cover the tension between the Copyright Act and state law.
More Copyright Litigation Blog posts on preemption here.
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook 2010 by Raymond J. Dowd from West here
Monday, January 17, 2011
Copyright Litigation: Defamation Claim Based on Copyright Registration Filing Survives Summary Judgment
In Morris v. Atchity, 2010 WL 4181452 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2010), the court declined to grant a summary judgment motion dismissing a claim for defamation based on statements made in a copyright registration. This is an unusual claim, but the decision does not explain what the allegedly defamatory statement made was.
Any slander of title-type of claim would appear to be preempted by the Copyright Act: anyone can file a competing claim, this is the point of the copyright registration process. I didn't dig into the docket sheet to figure out what possible statement might be defamatory.
In Morris v. Atchity, Plaintiff Margaret Morris alleged that her work "Jesus Augustus: From Imperial Cult to Christianity" was infringed by a novel based on the work "The Ashes of Christ/The August God".
Plaintiff alleged that she submitted the work to defendant and had an implied contract. The court declined summary judgment on the implied contract, finding that material questions of fact precluded a dismissal based on preemption.
Defendants argued that the works share only a similar historical theory. In denying the motion, the court found that "reasonable minds might differ as to whether there are substantial similarities between the two works with respect to the protected expression of ideas contained in Plaintiff's literary work."
Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook 2010 by Raymond J. Dowd from West here
Sunday, February 25, 2007
Contracts Involving Uncopyrightable Ideas
Copyright does not protect "ideas". It also doesn't protect facts. But if parties agree by contract that one is going to pay another for an idea, that contract may be enforceable. In my mind, prior to doing any research, the lead case on contracts involving ideas is Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures, 1990 WL 357611 (Cal. Superior), 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1497, 17 Media L. Rep 1257 (Cal. Super. L.A. Co. 1990)(not reported in Cal. Rptr.). When I say "in my mind" - the story of columnist Art Buchwald submitting a 2.5 page treatment to Paramount Pictures, Paramount agreeing to pay him for the idea, and then reneging by making a film called "Coming to America" starring Eddie Murphy based on that idea without paying Buchwald is so memorable.
But when I conducted an "ALLFEDS" search on Westlaw, I found only one case citing the Buchwald case. Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454 (11th Cir. 1994). I didn't check the state database. But there were 68 secondary sources citing Buchwald. So it's a case in which the peanut gallery of legal commentators have great interest, but in which the courts have no interest. Over the last month I read Fatal Subtraction: How Hollywood Really Does Business (The Inside Story of Buchwald v. Paramount) by Pierce O'Donnell and Dennis McDougal (Doubleday 1992). It's a pretty good story for a lawyer to read in terms of case strategy, not giving up, and taking risks on some long shot legal theories where a client has really been wronged. O'Donnell had Buchwald's contract involving the story idea upheld and enforced, then turned around and invalidated its "industry standard" net profits provisions as unconscionable (there is a Buchwald II decision).
Arthur Miller, in Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind: An "Idea" Whose Time Has Come, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 703 (January 2006) argues that courts generally require "concreteness" and "novelty" to enforce agreements involving ideas. He provides a good survey of the case law in the area and argues for more federal protection. He claims a gestation period for the article of 56 years - since he was a 2L.
In Cavagnuolo v. Rudin, 1996 WL 79861 (S.D.N.Y.) the court observed that California has no novelty requirement for contracts involving ideas (citing Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1956) nor does New York (citing Apfel v. Prudential-Bach Securities Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 470 (1993).
Where owners of a database used a "shrink-wrap" license to bar licensees from using the database for commercial mailings, the provision was upheld. ProCD Incorporated v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). Michigan law doesn't require novelty in contract to submit ideas. Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell, 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001). In a case criticized by Miller, at least one court let a contract block reverse-engineering because it was forbidden by the license agreement. Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003)(permitting a party to "contract away" a fair use defense of reverse engineering).
California law will create an implied in fact contract in idea submission cases. Levin v. The Gap, 1998 WL 915897 (S.D.N.Y.). But California will require evidence of industry custom to pay for ideas before doing so. Dallier v. Levi Straus & Co., 86 F.3d 1149 (4th Cir. 1996)(unpublished). But for a court to let a plaintiff pursue an implied-in-fact contract, it should be set forth in the complaint. Willis v. Home Box Office, 57 Fed. Appx. 902 (2d Cir. 2003)(unpublished summary order).
Courts struggle with the problem of preemption: the extent to which Copyright law supplants state law in the area of protecting ideas. The law of trade secrets is a related area -protecting "ideas" unprotectable by copyright by keeping them secret or binding a select few through confidentiality agreements.
But when I conducted an "ALLFEDS" search on Westlaw, I found only one case citing the Buchwald case. Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454 (11th Cir. 1994). I didn't check the state database. But there were 68 secondary sources citing Buchwald. So it's a case in which the peanut gallery of legal commentators have great interest, but in which the courts have no interest. Over the last month I read Fatal Subtraction: How Hollywood Really Does Business (The Inside Story of Buchwald v. Paramount) by Pierce O'Donnell and Dennis McDougal (Doubleday 1992). It's a pretty good story for a lawyer to read in terms of case strategy, not giving up, and taking risks on some long shot legal theories where a client has really been wronged. O'Donnell had Buchwald's contract involving the story idea upheld and enforced, then turned around and invalidated its "industry standard" net profits provisions as unconscionable (there is a Buchwald II decision).
Arthur Miller, in Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind: An "Idea" Whose Time Has Come, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 703 (January 2006) argues that courts generally require "concreteness" and "novelty" to enforce agreements involving ideas. He provides a good survey of the case law in the area and argues for more federal protection. He claims a gestation period for the article of 56 years - since he was a 2L.
In Cavagnuolo v. Rudin, 1996 WL 79861 (S.D.N.Y.) the court observed that California has no novelty requirement for contracts involving ideas (citing Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1956) nor does New York (citing Apfel v. Prudential-Bach Securities Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 470 (1993).
Where owners of a database used a "shrink-wrap" license to bar licensees from using the database for commercial mailings, the provision was upheld. ProCD Incorporated v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). Michigan law doesn't require novelty in contract to submit ideas. Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell, 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001). In a case criticized by Miller, at least one court let a contract block reverse-engineering because it was forbidden by the license agreement. Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003)(permitting a party to "contract away" a fair use defense of reverse engineering).
California law will create an implied in fact contract in idea submission cases. Levin v. The Gap, 1998 WL 915897 (S.D.N.Y.). But California will require evidence of industry custom to pay for ideas before doing so. Dallier v. Levi Straus & Co., 86 F.3d 1149 (4th Cir. 1996)(unpublished). But for a court to let a plaintiff pursue an implied-in-fact contract, it should be set forth in the complaint. Willis v. Home Box Office, 57 Fed. Appx. 902 (2d Cir. 2003)(unpublished summary order).
Courts struggle with the problem of preemption: the extent to which Copyright law supplants state law in the area of protecting ideas. The law of trade secrets is a related area -protecting "ideas" unprotectable by copyright by keeping them secret or binding a select few through confidentiality agreements.
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